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Liability of Internet Host Providers in Defamation Actions:  
From Gatekeepers to Identifiers 
Anne S.Y. Cheung

 
 
Internet intermediary liabilities in defamation actions have posed vexing legal 
problems in the new Internet social era of Web 2.0, especially when users can 
generate and spread their own content anonymously without being easily identified. In 
such an event, Internet intermediaries or Internet service providers (ISPs) can become 
defendants in defamation actions, the legal outcome of which is highly dependent on 
the roles they play in most jurisdictions, that is, whether the ISPs are categorised as 
content, access or host providers.
1
  
Amongst the three different types of intermediaries, host providers are in a 
legally nebulous position. Unlike content providers who are actively involved in 
contributing to the content of the disputed defamatory statement and should be liable 
in defamation actions, and unlike access providers, who only connect users to the 
Internet through a telecommunications network and thus should not be liable, host 
providers are caught in the middle. They have ‘hosted’ a website or provided a 
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platform for their customers, hence allowing their presence and facilitating their 
publications. Common forms of host providers are social networking sites such as 
Facebook and Myspace, and Internet forums or bulletin boards such as Ubuntu 
Forums (the largest help and support forum for Linux users) and Tianya (the most 
popular forum in China, with more than 85,000,000 registered users).
2
 The operators 
of these platforms enable users to post their own content and upload their own profiles, 
pictures and films. However, in most cases, the host providers do not exercise any 
prior control or active monitoring before users upload material,
3
 notwithstanding the 
fact that there may be basic ground rules stating that defamatory or other unlawful 
content should not be posted.
4
 Still, host providers have access to and dominion over 
their own servers, and can remove users’ content after publication. Overall, host 
providers are not as active as content providers, but neither are they as passive as 
access providers – they are not authors, yet not mere conduits. Clearly, they provide 
                                                 
2
 See ‘Introduction to Tianya [Tianya jianjie]’ (Tianya) 
<http://help.tianya.cn/about/history/2011/06/02/166666.shtml> (in Chinese) accessed 6 January 2014.  
3
 For example, based on interviews with online editors and community managers at 104 news 
organisations from 63 countries, a report found that ‘there was a relatively even split between those that 
moderate pre- and post-publication: 38 and 42, respectively, with 16 adopting a mixed approach’. 
See Emma Goodman, ‘Online Comment Moderation: Emerging Best Practices’ (The World 
Association of Newspapers, 2013) 
<http://www.wan-ifra.org/reports/2013/10/04/online-comment-moderation-emerging-best-practices> 
accessed 6 January 2014. 
4
 For example, according to the Guardian’s Community Standards and Participation Guidelines, 
‘personal attacks (on authors, other users or any individual), persistent trolling and mindless abuse will 
not be tolerated’. The Guardian’s moderation team usually ‘post-moderate[s] nearly all comment 
threads’, but for ‘certain special series or articles which may contain extremely sensitive content, such 
as Blogging the Qur’an, [all] comments are pre-moderated before appearing on the site’, see 
‘Community Standards and Participation Guidelines’ (The Guardian, 7 May 2009). 
<http://www.theguardian.com/community-standards> accessed 6 January 2014 and ‘Frequently Asked 
Questions about Community on the Guardian Website’ (The Guardian, 7 May 2009). 
<http://www.theguardian.com/community-faqs#310> accessed 6 January 2014. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2428566 
3 
 
platforms and invite and encourage postings, thereby earning revenue from 
advertisements on the sites. Should we then hold host providers accountable in 
defamation actions? 
Interestingly, different answers were given in three jurisdictions in 2013, 
representing diverse judicial and legislative positions. First, the European Court of 
Human Rights held in Delfi AS v. Estonia that an Internet news provider was liable for 
the comments posted by its readers despite the fact that it had removed the 
objectionable content upon receiving notice from the claimant.
5
 Although the 
damages awarded against the host provider were modest (€320), the judgment 
remains controversial and the repercussions have been wide. Second, the Court of 
Final Appeal (CFA) of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region (Hong Kong) 
decided on the liability of online service providers in the case of Oriental Press 
Group Ltd. v. Fevaworks Solutions Ltd
6
 (hereinafter referred as Feva). The highest 
court in Hong Kong confirmed the decisions of the lower courts and ruled that the 
provider of an online discussion forum is liable for defamatory remarks posted by third 
parties, and that therefore when it has received notification from a complainant it has a 
duty to remove the defamatory remarks within a reasonable time.
7
 This approach to 
                                                 
5
 App no 64569/09 (ECtHR, 10 October 2013) 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-126635> accessed 6 January 2014. 
6
 [2013] HKCFA 47. 
7
 [2009] HKCFI 964; [2009] 5 HKLRD 641; HCA597/2009, affirmed by Court of Appeal [2012] 
HKCA 5; [2012] 1 HKLRD 848; [2012] 6 HKC 313; CACV53/2011, affirmed by Court of Final 
Appeal, [2013] HKCFA 47. For comments on decisions from the lower courts, see Gabriela Kennedy, 
4 
 
liability appears to be in line with the legal positions in other jurisdictions, which have 
largely been based on a notice-and-take-down regime. However, a careful analysis of 
the Feva judgment revealed that the Hong Kong court reached this conclusion through 
an extension of common law principles in holding online intermediaries of discussion 
forums as ‘secondary publishers’ with liabilities imposed from the outset.8 In both the 
Delfi and Feva judgments, what has been decided but far from settled is an online host 
provider’s duty to monitor. The disputed aspects cover when such duty arises, and 
what its nature and scope are. In contrast to these two positions, which treated host 
providers as gatekeepers, the third alternative was provided by the newly amended 
Defamation Act of the United Kingdom, which came into full force on the first day of 
2014.
9
 To a great extent, as subsequent discussion shows, the duties and liabilities of 
host providers under the new regime depend on whether the originator of the 
defamatory statement can be identified. The new Act has consolidated the common 
law position and the European Union Directive 2000/31/EC (better known as the 
Electronic Commerce (EC) Directive
10
, enforced through the Electronic Commerce 
(EC Directive Regulations 2002),
11
 with specific provisions governing the liabilities 
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of online website operators (section 5), new regulations outlining the rules on notice 
requirements given by the complainant and corresponding procedures on what an ISP 
should do upon receiving notice.
12
  
In comparing and studying the approaches applied by the three abovementioned 
legal regimes, this chapter argues that it is necessary to have a special regulatory 
regime for Internet host providers. To be fair to host providers, users and victims of 
defamatory statements, clear guidelines on host providers’ monitoring duties and 
ground rules for users should be stated at the outset. At the time of writing, it is 
unknown how the appeal to the Delfi case will be decided by the Grand Chamber of 
the European Court,
13
 how the judgment of the Feva case will be interpreted in Hong 
Kong and how the newly amended Defamation Act will be implemented in the UK. 
What is certain is that the legal battle will continue and is likely to remain intense. 
 
Delfi AS v. Estonia: Internet News Portal’s Duty to Prevent Harm 
 
The Legal Battle over ‘Add Your Comment’ 
                                                 
12
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The legal dispute in Delfi originated with an online news article in 2006, reported 
on the applicant Internet news portal, concerning a change in ferry routes that led to a 
delay in the opening of an ice road. It was implied that a cheaper means of transport 
between the mainland in Estonia and certain islands nearby had also been inevitably 
delayed. The report attracted 185 comments in the portal’s ‘Add Your Comment’ 
section within two days, about twenty of which were abusive and contained personal 
threats and offensive language against L, who was a member of the ferry company’s 
supervisory board.
14
 Six weeks later, the applicant received a request from L’s 
lawyers to remove the offensive comments, and a claim of damages.
15
 Although the 
messages were promptly removed on the same date the request letter was received, 
Delfi refused to pay damages. Thus, a civil lawsuit was brought by L. The influence 
of the applicant company should not be underestimated, as it is one of the largest 
Internet news portals in Estonia, with a presence in Latvia and Lithuania.
16
 On 
average, each day it publishes up to 330 articles and attracts the comments of 
approximately 10,000 readers.
17
 
Although the local court ruled in favour of Delfi in the first round, this was 
overturned by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Estonia. The latter ruled 
that Delfi could not rely on the Information Society Services Act of Estonia, which 
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16
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17
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was based on the European Union Electronic Commerce Directive. Under the 
Electronic Commerce Directive,  the circumstances in which Internet intermediaries 
should be held accountable for materials that are hosted, cached or carried by them, 
but which they did not create are defined.
18
 Article 15 of the Directive clearly 
stipulates that ISPs have no general duty to monitor information that passes through 
or is hosted on their system. In effect, it provides a ‘safe haven’ for the exemption of 
ISPs’ liability when they are host providers, unless they have actual knowledge of 
unlawful activity or information
19
 and have failed to act expeditiously to remove the 
materials or disable access to the information upon obtaining such knowledge or 
awareness.
20
 In effect, the Directive has set up a notice-and-take-down regime for 
online intermediaries. However, the appellant courts in Estonia ruled that Delfi was 
not immune from liability as it was not a merely technical, automatic and passive 
intermediary.
21
 Rather than applying the Information Society Services Act, the Court 
of Appeal and the Supreme Court applied the Obligations Act.
22
 According to their 
judicial opinion, Delfi was a publisher and a provider of content services because it 
had integrated the comment environment into its news portal and had invited users to 
                                                 
18
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post comments.
23
 It had also derived economic benefits from the comments due to 
the advertisements on its portals.
24
 Above all, only Delfi could remove the 
objectionable comments, whereas the original users who posted them could not. Thus, 
the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court concluded that Delfi should bear the 
burden of publisher to prevent harmful publication.
25
  
Undeterred, Delfi appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. The issue 
has become whether the national courts of Estonia had infringed on Delfi’s freedom 
of expression as protected under article 10 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights. The European Court confirmed the domestic court’s decision and held that the 
finding of liability by the former was a justified and proportionate restriction on 
Delfi’s right to freedom of expression. This was mainly because the comments posted 
were highly offensive, insulting and threatening in nature; the postings were in 
reaction to an article published by the appellant; the appellant had failed to prevent the 
offensive postings from becoming public but had profited from the postings; the 
authors of the posts were anonymous; and the fine imposed by the national courts was 
not excessive.
26
 
 
Walking the Tightrope of Host Providers 
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The European Court’s choice to defer to the domestic court’s decision in not 
applying the Electronic Commerce Directive was understandably disappointing.
27
 
Many felt that Delfi had already acted in a responsible way as a news portal. 
Specifically, the news portal had an online report button for users to comment or 
complaint, a filter system that delete automatically comments that include vulgar 
words, and a policy of notice and takedown upon request. In light of this, critics 
consider the judgment a ‘serious blow to freedom of expression online’ that ‘send[s] a 
shiver of fear down any website operator’s spine,’28 displaying ‘a profound failure to 
understand the EU legal framework regulating intermediary liability’ that 
‘conveniently ignores relevant international standards in the area of freedom of 
expression on the Internet.’29 They also raised concerns that the judgment would 
impose a strict and onerous pre-publication monitoring standard on news portals in 
the future, possibly leading to comment sections being closed or a pre-registration 
system for users.
30
 Furthermore, some were puzzled as to why Delfi had to bear the 
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brunt of the blame when it acted swiftly to take down the objectionable postings 
despite the fact that the claimant took six weeks to complain through traditional 
mail.
31
 Others found it alarming that the Court would rule that a news organisation 
should have anticipated that a report of public interest would attract negative and 
hostile comments and should have exercised a degree of caution and diligence to 
avoid infringing on others’ reputations.32 
The standard set by the Estonian Court and endorsed by the European Court is 
stringent and demanding for any ISP, especially compared with the situation in the US. 
The latter, arguably, is the most favourable to any intermediary, including host 
providers. Under s.230 of the Communications Decency Act, ‘[n]o provider or user of 
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider’.33 This can be most 
unfair to victims of anonymous and vexatious online defamatory postings, as seen in 
the case of Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
34
 However, if both the strict standard of the 
                                                 
31
 Guillemin (n 29); Voorhoof (n 28); Eileen Weinert, ‘Oracle at “Delfi” – European Court of Human 
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28, 31. 
32
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2007) 464-66. 
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European Court and the lenient US approach are equally unsatisfactory, how should 
the  balance be struck that is fair to both ISPs and claimants in defamatory actions?  
Some may claim that the notice-and-take-down regime under the EU Electronic 
Commerce Directive has provided a fair solution. They may further argue that had the 
Directive applied in the case of Delfi, the news portal would not have been found 
liable, and that it was wrong for the Estonian courts to rule that Delfi was a content 
provider and a publisher.
35
 Yet the line between the latter two categories and a host 
provider is delicate. The protection of the EC Directive defences may be easily lost 
when an intermediary is perceived as being too active. ISPs must often ‘walk the 
tightrope of liability’ to maintain their status as mere hosts.36  
To summarise briefly, in the Delfi case, the Estonian courts justified their 
decision in ruling the Internet news portal to be a content provider and a publisher 
largely due to the fact that Delfi had integrated the commenting environment for 
readers into its news portal and invited users to post comments.
37
 Delfi had also 
determined which comments were published and which were not, and only it could 
remove or change them.
38
 Foremost, the original authors could not delete or modify 
their own comments once posted. The European Court was convinced by the domestic 
                                                 
35
 Guillermin (n 29); Voorhoof (n 28).  
36
 Steven James, ‘Tightening the Net: Defamation Reform and ISPs’ [2012] Entertainment Law 
Review 197. 
37
 Delfi (n 5) [25], [27]. 
38
 Ibid [27]. 
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courts. In a similar vein, it also highlighted the substantial degree of control over 
comments exercised by Delfi.
39
 
 Regardless whether one agrees with the reasoning, Delfi is not the only case in 
which a seemingly neutral intermediary host was being categorised as a content 
provider or a publisher by the courts. In the UK, where the Electronic Commerce 
Directive is implemented through the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) 
Regulations 2002,
40
 similar disputes have arisen. The English High Court held in 
Kaschke v Gray that an ISP of a web blog had lost the protection of the EC Directive 
Regulations because it had corrected the spelling and grammar of blogs posted by its 
users.
41
 In the appeal against a summary judgment hearing, Justice Stadlen 
considered the ISP to have been actively engaged with the content, such that the 
extent of its control had gone beyond the mere storage function – an essential criterion 
of a host under Regulation 19.
42
 In another case, McGrath v Dawkins, the English 
High Court was asked to consider whether Amazon, the world’s biggest online book 
                                                 
39
 Ibid [89]. 
40
 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2013, reg 19. 
41
 [2010] EWHC 690 (QB). For comments, see Robert Lundie-Smith, ‘Kaschke v Gray: The 
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272. 
42
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is made, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which it would have been apparent to the service 
provider that the activity or information was unlawful; or 
(ii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to 
the information, and 
(b) the recipient of the service was not acting under the authority or the control of the service provider.’ 
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seller, should be held liable for defamatory remarks posted by readers in its ‘Review’ 
section.
43
 The case shared various factual similarities with Delfi: it had a moderation 
policy of limited pre-publication control by automatic filter for forbidden words, a 
blacklist system against users who had used profane language, a ‘Report Abuse’ 
button and a notice-and-take-down procedure.
44
 Most notably, it had invited readers 
to write reviews on books selected by the website,
45
 and reviews that contained 
forbidden words were submitted for manual check before the final decision to exclude 
was made.
46
 It was only because the complainant in McGrath had failed to give 
effective notice to Amazon of what the defamatory statement constituted and why it 
was ‘unlawful’ (the strength and weakness of any available defence under defamation 
law)
47
 that Amazon was ‘bound to succeed’ under Regulation 19 and the English 
court was saved from resolving the difficult question in deciding whether Amazon 
was a mere host. Nevertheless, the court noted obiter that had the disputed postings in 
the case at bar triggered any manual review, Amazon’s position might have been very 
                                                 
43
 [2012] EWHC B3 (QB). Application for leave rejected [2013] EWCA Civ 206. For comments, see 
Inforrm, ‘Case Law: McGrath v Dawkins – Creationism, Atheism and Internet forums, where Libel 
Law Should Fear to Tread’ (Inforrm’s Blog, 18 April 2012). 
<http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/04/18/case-law-mcgrath-v-dawkins-creationism-atheism-and-inter
net-forums-where-libel-law-should-fear-to-tread/> accessed 11 January 2014. 
44
 McGrath (n 43) [33]. 
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 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
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different under s.1 of the Defamation Act 1996 (the scope of which is explained 
further under part III), as it might have been considered an editor.
48
 
The Gatekeeper’s Duty to Prevent Harm 
The Delfi judgment, as noted earlier, was also affected by various other 
considerations such as the economic interests of the ISP. It is, therefore, hard to tell 
whether the ruling would have been different if Delfi had played a more passive or 
reactive role in letting its readers retain the power to delete or amend comments after 
submission. All we know is that since the ruling by the domestic court, Delfi has 
implemented a new set of policies and measures. These include not allowing persons 
who have posted offensive comments to post any new comments without reading and 
accepting the rules of commenting; setting up a team of moderators who conduct 
follow-up moderation of comments posted on the portal; reviewing all user notices of 
inappropriate comments; and ensuring that comments comply with the rules of 
commenting.
49
 On average, Delfi removed about 8% of the comments, mainly spam 
and irrelevant remarks, whereas defamatory comments constituted less than 0.5% of 
the total number.
50
 Nevertheless, Delfi should not be dismissed as having little 
                                                 
48
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 Delfi (n 5) [30]. 
50
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application to the general online Internet environment.
51
 It is not and will not be a 
single case. 
In fact, many online intermediaries are in a factual position analogous to that of 
Delfi. Many online discussion forums have been moderating their own portals. Based 
on interviews with online editors and community managers at 104 news organisations 
from 63 countries in 2013, it was found that 38 organisations exercised 
pre-publication moderation while 42 exercised post-publication moderation, with 16 
adopting a mixed approach.
52
 Of the 97 organisations that allowed online comments, 
they admitted occasionally blocking comments from being published and deleting 
comments after publication.
53
 The average deletion rate was 11% and the most 
common reason for such was the inclusion of offensive language.
54
 Other than 
filtering keywords, 71% said that they blocked blacklisted individuals either by their 
accounts or by their IP addresses.
55
 In addition, one of the publications expressed that 
they had a moderating team to read comments.
56
 Indisputably, a significant number 
of news portals and discussion forums have endeavoured to act responsibly, but in 
doing so, they may have lost their immunity as host providers. 
                                                 
51
 J19 and J20 v Facebook Ireland, [2013] NIQB 113 [29]-[32]. 
52
 Goodman (n 3) 7. 
53
 Ibid, 36. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Ibid,38. 
56
 Ibid, 33. 
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 Unless future judicial rulings or statutory provisions can clarify the exact factual 
basis for Delfi’s liability or that of other online discussion forum providers, the 
problems concerning their status and their scope of monitoring duty are likely to 
recur. 
 
Oriental Press Group v Fevaworks: Online Discussion Forum as 
Publisher
57
 
 
If a statutory regime designed specifically to govern the responsibilities of ISPs 
in defamation cannot adequately resolve the problems faced by host providers, one 
can imagine the confusion and frustration that ISPs face in a pure common law 
jurisdiction, as illustrated in the Hong Kong case of Oriental Press Group v 
Fevaworks. 
The respondents (defendants) in the case were the providers, administrators and 
managers of a website that hosted one of the most popular Internet discussion forums 
in Hong Kong, known as the Hong Kong Golden Forum.
58
 It boasted having 30,000 
users online at any given time and over 5,000 postings each hour during peak hours.
59
 
                                                 
57
 Discussion of the Fevaworks case can be found also in Anne S.Y. Cheung, ‘A Study of Online 
Forum Liabilities for Defamation: Hong Kong Court in Internet Fever’ (2013) 18 Media and Arts Law 
Review 382. 
58
 Feva (n 6) [12].  
59
 Ibid [15]. 
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Use of the forum was free to registered members and its revenue came from 
advertisement sponsorship.
60
 The administrators did not edit or filter messages.
61
 In 
fact, the Forum had only two administrators monitoring its discussion for six to eight 
hours per day, with the duty of removing objectionable content.
62
 On the other side of 
the legal battle, the appellants (the plaintiffs) were the publishers of the Oriental Press 
Groups running the Oriental Daily, which is one of the most popular local 
newspapers.  
The legal action was concerned with three statements posted on the Golden 
Forum in 2007, 2008 and 2009 by third parties alleging that the appellants were 
involved in drug trafficking, money laundering and other illegal, immoral and corrupt 
activities.
63
 The respondents were alerted to the existence of the first two statements 
and the 2008 statement was removed from the website within three and a half hours of 
the respondents being informed.
64
 The 2007 statement, however, was not removed 
from the website until more than eight months after the respondents had been 
informed.
65
 The 2009 statement was removed immediately by the respondents 
themselves on their own discovery.
66
 The lower courts dismissed the claims 
regarding the 2008 and 2009 statements, but held the respondents liable for the 2007 
                                                 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Ibid. 
63
 Ibid [6]. 
64
 Ibid [7]. 
65
 Ibid. 
66
 Ibid [8]. 
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statement due to their unreasonable delay in taking down the offending post upon 
notice. For this, the appellants were awarded of HK$100,000 (approximately 
US$13,000) as damages.
67
 The appellants were not satisfied with the outcome and 
the amount of damages. Hence, they applied for leave to appeal.  
In the final round of the legal battle, the Court of Final Appeal was asked to 
consider the extent to which providers of Internet forums may be held liable for the 
posting of defamatory statements by their users.
68
 To answer this, the Court had to 
decide whether Internet forum providers should be considered publishers of 
defamatory postings by third parties and whether the common law defence of 
innocent dissemination was available to them.
69
 
 
Feva before Court 
As the Defamation Ordinance of Hong Kong does not cover issues and liabilities 
specifically concerning Internet service providers, the Court had to rely on existing 
common law principles. In sum, the Court first established that an online discussion 
forum was a ‘secondary publisher’ from the outset, to which the defence of innocent 
dissemination was applicable. The Court then differentiated between an online 
discussion forum and a notice board provider, such that the latter’s liability in 
                                                 
67
 Ibid [7]. 
68
 Ibid [11]. 
69
 Ibid. 
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defamation only arose upon notification of the defamatory statement. Throughout the 
entire legal discussion, what proved most critical was deciding when and to what 
extent liability arises for an online discussion forum. Yet in the attempt to fix the 
liability of an Internet discussion forum as secondary publisher from the outset under 
common law principles established in previous centuries, many more questions were 
being raised in the judicial reasoning than were answered. 
  
Publication and Innocent Dissemination 
Under common law, publication takes place when a defendant communicates a 
defamatory statement to a third party, and liability in defamation arises from 
participation in the publication of the defamatory matter.
70
 Prima facie, the author, 
editor, publisher, printer or vendor of a newspaper is liable.
71
 Having said that, the 
common law allows the defence of innocent dissemination to one who is not the first 
or main publisher of the libellous works but have only taken a ‘subordinate part in 
disseminating it’. Well known examples of the latter category are proprietors of 
libraries (Vizetelly v. Mudie’s Select Library Limited)72 and news vendors (Emmens v. 
Pottle).
73
 To rely on this defence, one must show that (1) he did not know or was 
innocent of any knowledge of the libel contained in the work disseminated by him, (2) 
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that there was nothing in the work or the circumstances under which it came to him or 
was disseminated by him that should have led him to suppose that it contained a libel 
and (3) that such want of knowledge was not due to any negligence on his part.
74
 The 
onus of proof is on the defendant.
75
 
 Although consensus has been reached on the result not to hold this person to 
be liable, judicial opinions differ as to when legal liability arises, and when not to 
place legal liability. In Tamiz v Google Inc., the English Court of Appeal considered 
that the successful invocation of the innocent dissemination defence leads to the 
defendant being deemed to have not published the libel at all.
76
 In that case, the 
English Court left it open whether Blogger, as provided by Google, might be regarded 
as a secondary publisher in hosting a blogging platform, although that could only be 
for the period after it had received notice by the complainant.
77
 Lord Justice Richards 
reasoned that there has been a long established line of authority that a person involved 
only in dissemination is not to be treated as a publisher unless he knew or ought by 
the exercise of reasonable care to have known that the publication was likely to be 
defamatory, and that Google could not be said to know or ought reasonably to have 
known of the defamatory comments prior to notification of the complaint.
78
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 The above reasoning, however, was rejected explicitly by the Hong Kong Court 
of Final Appeal in the Feva judgment.
79
 Instead, Ribeiro P.J., in delivering the 
leading judgment, opted to follow the Australian position in Thompson v. Australian 
Capital TV, which holds that ‘it would be more accurate to say that any disseminator 
of a libel publishes the libel but, if he can establish the defence of innocent 
dissemination, he will not be responsible for that publication’.80 
 This option is indeed a curious one. First, the facts of Tamiz v. Google were of 
direct relevance to the Feva case. Given that Tamiz v. Google was a dispute over the 
liabilities of a particular Blogger platform provided by Google, its nature shared many 
similarities with the Golden Forum. In contrast, Thompson v. Australian Capital TV 
was about the live broadcast of a live current affairs programme produced by another 
television station. The Australian High Court held that while the defendant did not 
have any real control over the defamatory material, innocent dissemination was not 
applicable as it was the defendant’s choice to choose the specific technical setup that 
caused the lack of control.
81
 Following the logic of the Australian case, the Hong 
Kong court should have ruled that Feva could not rely on an innocent dissemination 
defence, as it had chosen to run an online discussion forum knowing the set up’s 
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limitations. Such a result would have been a drastic blow to the running of most 
Internet service providers and a severe measure against freedom of expression. 
  
Primary and Secondary Publishers 
At this point, one cannot help but ask the fundamental question: what, exactly, is a 
publisher? Under common law as summarised by the Hong Kong Court, a primary 
publisher is one that knows or can easily acquire knowledge of the content of the 
article published and has a realistic ability to control its publication.
82
 The Hong 
Kong Court called these the ‘knowledge criterion’ and the ‘control criterion.’83 As 
the respondent’s online discussion forum did not have prior knowledge of the postings, 
was not aware of their content,
84
 and did not have the ability or opportunity to 
prevent their dissemination before notification,
85
 the Court ruled that the forum could 
not be seen as a primary publisher, but rather as a ‘secondary publisher’. 
 As previously mentioned, those who have played a subordinate part in 
dissemination are entitled to the innocent dissemination defence because they have 
merely played a ‘passive instrumental role in the process’ and do not have the 
sufficient degree of awareness or intention for the law to impose legal responsibility 
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for defamatory publications.
86
 They are most often referred to as ‘innocent 
disseminators’ or ‘subordinate distributors’, whereas Ribeiro P.J. of the Hong Kong 
CFA prefers to call them ‘secondary publishers’.87  
This test of innocent dissemination also requires one to exercise reasonable care 
and not be negligent, especially when one has been warned of libellous matter in a 
former publication issue.
88
 The test is readily applicable for print media, and is only 
fair to newsvendors and distributors. In the context of electronic media, however, it is 
questionable whether online discussion forums and other Internet service providers 
are analogous to distributors or innocent disseminators in the traditional sense. 
 The Hong Kong Court answered that they were the latter, because the 
respondent’s forum could not have realistically monitored each user post before its 
publication and likewise did not have the ability to edit or prevent the defamatory 
comments from being published.
89
 Earlier in the reasoning, the Court noted that the 
nature of publication on the Internet was a qualitatively different process – an open, 
interactive procedure involving ‘many-to-many’ communications, such that the new 
intermediaries were not originators of content, but rather mere facilitators.
90
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When Does Liability Arise? 
 If that is the case, then how can online discussion forums as secondary publishers 
satisfy the requirements under the defence of innocent dissemination both before and 
after they have become aware of the defamatory content of the offending posts? 
 The position, once the discussion forum has received notice, is straightforward. 
In the opinion of the Hong Kong Court, the defendant should promptly take all 
reasonable steps to remove the offending content from circulation as soon as 
reasonably practicable.
91
 However, the position before receiving notice has remained 
confusing and unsatisfactory. 
 Ribeiro P.J. made it clear that ‘the focus of the innocent dissemination defence 
has been on past, completed publications in which the defendant was not aware of the 
defamatory content and could not, with reasonable care, have discovered it’.92 In 
Feva, the respondent had only two administrators to monitor the very high volume of 
Internet traffic in its online forum, thus the Court concluded that they had no realistic 
means of acquiring such knowledge or of exercising editorial control over the 
content.
93
 In addition, in the Court’s opinion, there was nothing to alert the 
respondent before the 2007 complaint.
94
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 Given this position, the Court does not seem to have required prior monitoring 
by online discussion forums. In fact, one would arguably be in a better position not to 
have any administrators to monitor the forum. Otherwise, the online discussion forum 
may be held liable as a primary publisher exercising control, with required knowledge 
of the content of the postings. Compared with Ribeiro P.J.’s judgment, spotted 
correctly and addressed directly, but unfortunately not answered fully, were the issues 
raised by Justice Litton in the Feva case. In the concurring opinion of Justice Litton, 
the defendants as a forum host have ‘in theory’ ‘some control’ over the content of the 
statements published on the website, otherwise they would not have discovered, on 
their own initiative, the 2009 defamatory statement.
95
 Also raised but not answered 
by Justice Litton was that it ‘may not be enough’ to ‘merely employ two 
administrators to monitor forum discussion for six to eight hours a day, five days a 
week’.96 Finally, he also noted that while keyword filtering and monitoring might not 
be feasible, there was nothing to suggest that having the administrators highlight the 
identities of key persons could not be an alternative to preventing the posting of 
defamatory statements against the appellants.
97
 
What the Hong Kong Court has failed to clarify is the standard of care required 
by online discussion forums before acquiring knowledge or notification of alleged 
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defamatory postings. Adrian Fong pointed out that Ribeiro P.J. set the ‘reasonable 
care’ standard so low that it discourages good faith monitoring by large online social 
platform operators.
98
 Regrettably, online discussion forums were left in limbo at this 
stage. Was the Court saying that it was unrealistic to monitor the Internet traffic and 
content of each individual posting in a popular discussion forum, and thus no 
monitoring duty should be imposed? Or was the Court saying that had the Feva 
discussion forum employed more administrators, then the basis of liability would have 
been different? If, in the future, a more advanced and powerful software is available 
for content screening and filtering, will online discussion forums and other Internet 
service providers be required to install it? 
The unnecessary logical complexities involved in regarding the respondents as 
secondary publishers from the outset, with actual liability imposed only at the point of 
notification, are even more noticeable when Ribeiro P.J. stated that providers of 
discussion forums should not be treated on a par with the occupiers of premises 
because they ‘played an active role in encouraging and facilitating the multitude of 
Internet postings by members of their forum … they designed the forum … they laid 
down conditions for becoming a member and being permitted to make postings … 
they employed administrators whose job was to monitor discussions and to delete 
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postings which broke the rules; they derived income from advertisements placed on 
their website’.99 In his opinion, the online forums were clearly participants and 
publishers from the outset. While Ribeiro P.J. has argued convincingly that 
defamatory postings by third parties on online discussion forums should not be 
compared with unauthorised postings on notice boards run by a golf club, as in Byrne 
v Deane (a case dating back to 1937),
100
 it is difficult to conceptualise a situation in 
which one might apply the test results in a finding that a defendant has published due 
to active participation in publication, but that same degree of participation and 
involvement do not prevent a defence of innocent dissemination from arising. 
These difficulties could be avoided if the Hong Kong Court recognised the 
unique nature of online discussion forums and concluded that liability arises only 
upon notification. An online discussion forum is simply not a primary publisher due 
to the lack of required knowledge and control in the interactive and user-generated 
content environment of the Internet world. Yet it is not as passive as a secondary 
publisher in the traditional sense of being a library or a news vendor, due to its active 
role in hosting and running the online platform and in inviting participation. Rather 
than distorting the nature of online discussion forums so that they can be mapped into 
a common law equivalent of primary or secondary publisher, future disputes would be 
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better resolved through statutory guidelines designed for a new category of Internet 
intermediaries.  
While the result of Feva in imposing liabilities on the defendant only for the 
2007 statement, which it took eight months to remove, was justified, a more viable 
legal solution would have been to adopt a statutory provision that clearly stipulates 
the basis and nature of liability for Internet intermediaries based on their roles (as 
facilitator, as host, as moderator). As we have seen in the Feva case, it is both 
artificial and unsatisfactory to fit an invention of the Internet era into the straitjacket 
of 19th- century defamation common law. 
 
The Legislative Attempt in the United Kingdom: Identified or 
Unidentified Poster 
Parallel to the legal developments of the judiciary in the European Court and in 
Hong Kong, the UK witnessed significant legislative changes in defamation law in 
2013.
101
 The Defamation Act 2013, with specific provisions governing Internet 
intermediaries, complements the Defamation Act of 1996 and the EU Regulations 
2002 without replacing them. 
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The legal liabilities of ISPs in the pre-2013 era hinged much on their roles. For 
instance, Section 1(3)(e) of the Defamation Act of 1996 stipulates that a ‘person shall 
not be considered the author, editor, or publisher of a statement if he is only involved 
as the operator of or provider of access to a communication system by means of 
which the statement is transmitted, or made available, by a person over whom he has 
no effective control.’ However, the defence is only available to the ISP if it can show 
that (1) it was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement; (2) that it has taken 
reasonable care in respect of its publication; and that (3) it did not know, and had no 
reason to believe, that what he did caused or contributed to the publication of a 
defamatory statement.
102
 The first two criteria have forced host providers to face the 
notorious ‘catch -22’ dilemma: in seeking to attract the statutory defence by taking 
reasonable care, they have instead forfeited it by being considered too proactive and 
hence have become editors.
103
 The last criterion may mean that an ISP who is 
initially being considered as a host provider may end up being a publisher once it has 
received notice of a defamatory statement, as in Tamiz v Google. 
 Unlike the Defamation Act of 1996, which is dominated by the lexicon of 
authors, editors and publishers used in common law defamation actions, the immunity 
granted under the EC Regulations 2002 is based on whether the ISP is considered a 
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mere conduit, a cache or a host. In addition, the knowledge requirement on the part of 
an ISP also differs between the two statutes. As discussed earlier in Part II of this 
chapter, the Defamation Act requires that the ISP has knowledge of the defamatory 
statement concerned, while the EC Regulation refers to the unlawfulness of the 
statement. While the former only notes the injury to another’s reputation, the latter 
requires that enough evidence be adduced to show the strengths or weaknesses of the 
case’s available defences.104  
 Without changing these standards, the Defamation Act of 2013 has added a new 
defence to Internet intermediaries (referred to as website operators under the Act).
105
 
Under s.5(2), the defence allows the operator to show that ‘it was not the operator 
who posted the statement on the website’. Furthermore, s5(12) states that the defence 
is not defeated by reason, only by the fact that the website operator is a moderator of 
the statements posted by others. The defence will, however, be defeated if the 
claimant shows that (1) it was not possible for him to identify the person who posted 
the statement; (2) he gave the operator a notice of complaint in relation to the 
statement;
106
 and (3) the operator failed to respond to the notice within the required 
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provision, which is 48 hours as stated in the Defamation Regulations.
107
 The other 
ground on which the defence is defeated is when the website operator has acted with 
malice in relation to the posting of the statement concerned (s.5(11)).
108
 In addition to 
s.5, s.10 provides that a court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an 
action for defamation brought against one who was not the author, editor or publisher 
of the statement complained of, unless the court is satisfied that it is not reasonably 
practicable for an action to be brought against the author, editor or publisher.
109
 As 
scholars have commented, this makes it ‘significantly more difficult to proceed 
against online intermediaries’.110 From now on, much will be dependent on whether 
the original poster, defined as ‘the person who posted the statement complained of on 
the website referred to in the notice of complaint,’111 can be identified. 
If the poster can be identified and subject to his consent, the ISP can pass the 
poster’s full name and postal address of residence or business to the complainant, and 
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leave the post on the site,
112
 unless and until the court orders its remover under s.13 
of the Act. If it is not possible to identify the poster,
113
 or if the poster fails to respond 
within 48 hours,
114
 then the ISP can then take down the post within 48 hours of 
receiving a notice of complaint.  
The new approach is not without problems. First, victims of defamatory 
statements will face a very unpleasant situation if the poster is willing to have a legal 
confrontation in court, when the statement could be left online without any notice of 
complaint attached.
115
 Second, the new statute has not resolved the conflicting 
assessment standards of claims by the ISP upon receiving notice of complaint 
between the UK Defamation Act since 1996 (‘defamatory’) and the EU Regulations 
(‘unlawful’).116 Third, the scope of s.10 of the new Act remains uncertain regarding 
what being ‘reasonably practicable for an action to be brought against the author, 
editor or publisher’ would constitute.117 Namely, would a claimant be required to 
pursue a Norwich Pharmacal order from the court for the disclosure of anonymous 
user details before going to court? What should one do when the post is uploaded by 
an overseas author to a local website? Above all, as many posters do not use real 
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names to register, it is uncertain whether the new law would lead to a system of real 
name registration and verification before posting, or whether this would simply imply 
a swift notice-and-take-down system for ISPs. Its effect on anonymous posting is 
difficult to predict.
118
 Nevertheless, it is no longer necessary to identify with 
precision the degree of an ISP’s involvement (whether it has exceeded its capacity 
and has become a publisher), the nature of the knowledge it has about the contested 
statement and its role (whether it is a mere host or not), as long as it is not responsible 
for the offending statement.  
 
Conclusion 
 The social and participatory nature of Web 2.0 has presented unprecedented 
problems for defamation disputes. It challenges our traditional understanding of what 
publishers are, begs us to redress the grievances faced by victims of defamation 
actions in the face of anonymous writers and confronts us with wrongs for which host 
providers are asked to share responsibility. 
 In reviewing the three legal attempts to define the responsibilities of 
intermediaries in defamation, we have seen the uphill legal battles that host providers 
must wage. Despite the fact that the three jurisdictions studied are premised largely on 
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a seemingly sensible notice-and-take-down regime for intermediaries’ liabilities, the 
actual implementation of this standard has revealed many intricate legal problems yet 
to be solved. The statutory classification of intermediaries into mere conduit, cache or 
host may not be helpful, especially when such categorisation is highly fact sensitive. 
The courts have struggled to understand the technological roles and monitoring 
functions of Internet providers. Equally, our common law understanding of author, 
publisher and editor is hardly adequate. As one author observed, ‘defamation cases 
challenge the analogical abilities of the courts to apply traditional defamation analysis 
to a new technological medium.’119 In seeing host providers as publishers, courts are 
often preoccupied with enabling the victims to bypass the threshold for facing 
anonymous authors. In contrast to the approach of treating host providers as 
gatekeepers, the UK’s new Defamation Act has swept aside the necessity to classify 
the role and status of ISPs. In re-adjusting the focus to the identification of the 
original poster, it has opted for a practical and functional solution that enables victims 
of defamation with an adequate remedy while providing clearer guidelines to ISPs. 
Although the new solution offered by the UK Parliament is yet to be tested, it has 
re-drawn the parameters between host providers, users and victims of defamatory 
statements. 
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What can be safely concluded for now is that a statutory regime that can 
specifically address the liability of intermediaries without being shackled by their 
forms and functions is essential in defamation regulation. Regardless which approach 
is chosen, one should not lose sight of the notion that the ultimate concern of 
defamation is the protection of freedom of reputation without the undue sacrifice of 
freedom of expression, even in the ever-changing online social ecology of 
commenting and blogging. 
